Category Archives: Recent Activity

Zotac 4070 Shows Up Munged

Got an email last night from the USPS, informing me that the Zotac 4070 card I ordered would be delivered by 6:30 PM. This morning I walked to the mailbox to retrieve that item. As you can see in the edge-on photo, the 800-lb gorilla had his way with the card during shipment. The front plate is badly bent. Worse, the right-hand fan (from the top) doesn’t spin freely, as it properly should. I’m asking for a refund, as the Zotac 4070 shows up munged.

If Zotac 4070 Shows Up Munged, Now What?

I’m ordering a replacement card. Given the issues finding a performance GPU that’s also compact, I’m “trading down” to get a 5060 model for my next try. I just ordered a Gigabyte RTX 5060 Mini from Amazon, for delivery tomorrow. In the meantime, I’m fighting with the vendor platform — Mercari, in this case — for a refund. Somehow, the sale shows as completed even though I hadn’t even had the card in my hands for 18 hours when that status made itself known. I’m hoping I’ll get the purchase price back, but I have a bad feeling…

As I opened the package, in fact, I saw the front plate had been savaged in transit. “That can’t be good,” I thought. It wasn’t. Gosh only knows what hit this unit, but it literally looks stepped on. I can only hope I’ll get a refund: we’ll see about that.

Tomorrow Is Another Day

Amazon will put the next candidate in my hands tomorrow morning. I’ve never had trouble with their delivery resulting in damage of any kind, let alone the mauling that the Zotac card took en route. Fingers crossed that I can get it installed, and Secure Boot working, on the upstairs B550/5800X PC. These things happen here in Windows-World. Several lessons learned from this encounter, none of them good. Sigh, and sigh again…

 

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So Long Samsung ML-2850

Over the weekend, I saw a story at Tom’s Hardware that reported MS is phasing out V3 and V4 printer drivers.  “Hmmm,” I thought, “I bet this means my 2009 vintage monochrome laser printer is included.” Copilot confirmed that it’s time to say so long, Samsung ML-2850. It runs V3 printer drivers and MS is halting support for same, like now.

Succession Plans After So Long, Samsung ML-2850

The printer still works fine. And it still works — for the time being, at least — with Windows 11. But it’s just a matter of time before it won’t work any more. That might hit as early as whenever 26H2 hits public release. Or it might last as long as 27H2. But its days are now officially numbered.

Here’s my plan: I’m going to use up the laser cartridge(s) I have at my disposal. When the ML-2850 runs out of toner, it’s toast. At that point, I’ll drop it off at Goodwill, where I routinely recycle my used electronika.

How long does that give this device to remain in use here at Chez Tittel? I might print 100 pages of output a month on this printer, max — probably less. So it could be 6 months or more  before I pull the plug and pack it off to Goodwill. Let’s see what happens, shall we?

But Wait, There’s More…

My Dell 2155cn is also facing obsolescence, but it qualifies as a V4 driver, not V3. So I’ve probably got another year or two before it, too, goes off to Goodwill for lack of driver support. What will I buy next? I’m thinking something like the HP M455dn, which is a low-end business class networked color laser printer that retails for US$550-800 depending on bells and whistles. Or whatever its equivalent may be when I exhaust my final set of CMYK cartridges for that printer (I’ve got a set of spares, and CMY all ahow 100% in the Dell Printer Hub’s toner status display, with B at 80%).

I’ve got at least 2 years left on that printer, it seems. Then, I’ll buy another. Interesting note: it will probably be the last printer I ever purchase, seeing as how the Samsung has lasted 17 years, and the Dell more than 13. It seems that obsolescence comes calling long before the hardware itself runs out. That was also the case for my Apple LaserWriter 1, purchased in 1985 and still running like a champ when I gave it away in 2005. For all I know, it’s still running today — that thing was built like a battleship.

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Sysmon Lands in Windows 11 Beta

Lots of Windows nerds have spent years bolting Sysinternals’ Sysmon into every PC we work on. For them — and me — the latest Windows 11 Beta build (26220.7752) brings a welcome surprise: Sysmon is now a built-in optional feature. That’s right — no more downloading, unzipping, or scripting installs from Sysinternals. No need to run its handy web-based version, either. Microsoft has quietly slipped this powerful tool into the OS itself, and it’s ready to roll with some simple PowerShell commands.

What Sysmon Lands in Windows 11 Beta Means

Sysmon (System Monitor) has long been a staple in toolkits for security pros, blue teamers, and forensic analysts. It provides deep visibility into system activity — process creation, network connections, file writes, registry changes, and more. Until now, deploying Sysmon meant managing binaries and XML configuration files. With its inclusion as a Windows Optional Feature, Sysmon becomes easier to deploy, update, and manage across PC fleets.

PowerShell: Enable and Install Sysmon

To enable the built-in Sysmon feature from Windows itself, and then start monitoring stuff, run these two commands:

Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Sysmon
sysmon -i

In case it’s not obvious, the first command enables the Sysmon feature; the second installs it, ready for use.

Quick Peek: View Sysmon Events

Here’s a PowerShell one-liner that shows the 25 most recent Sysmon events.  Gives a taste of how it works and what it shows:

Get-WinEvent -LogName “Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational” -MaxEvents 25 | Format-Table -AutoSize

Unless your PC is acting up or ill, sysmon mostly shows process creation and termination (like here).

What Sysmon Illuminates

Sysmon shines brightest when you need to understand what’s really happening under the hood in Windows. It logs detailed info about process creation, including parent-child relationships, command-line arguments, and DLLs loaded. Sysmon captures network connections with source and destination IPs, ports, and process IDs. It can even detect code injections, image loads, and registry modifications. With a well-tuned configuration, Sysmon becomes a forensic goldmine. It’s like a time machine for system activity. Properly used, it can help you trace malware behavior, insider threats, and suspicious persistence mechanisms.

Adding Sysmon Into the Mix Is Good!

The integration of Sysmon into Windows 11 Beta is a quiet but powerful shift. It signals Microsoft’s growing commitment to built-in security observability and makes it easier than ever to deploy advanced monitoring at scale. For IT pros and security teams, this is a win. If you’re running a Beta build, it’s time to fire up PowerShell, flip the switch, and start watching your system like never before.

Showcasing Sysmon in Action

Sysmon’s long history in the Windows ecosystem is best illustrated through several well‑known case studies that show how deeply it illuminates system behavior. The three cases listed below not only show Sysmon’s diagnostic power but also its ability to reveal subtle, causal relationships that define complex system activity.

Together, these cases demonstrate Sysmon’s unique strengths: high‑fidelity process creation logging, deep visibility into network connections, precise registry and file‑system monitoring, and the ability to reconstruct causal chains that ordinary Windows logs simply cannot express. Whether used for diagnostics, security investigations, or system forensics, Sysmon remains one of the most powerful visibility tools available on Windows.

And that, dear readers, is why Sysmon is already well-regarded in Windows-World. That’s ultimately what makes it a amazing addition to the collection of built-in Windows features.

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Sprucing Up My Desktop Peripherals

If you look back at my recent bloggage, you’ll see that I spent far too much time recently jumping into and rooting around in UEFI. Specifically, I found myself exposed to the oddities of the Asrock UEFI, which turns out to be finicky in many unexpected ways. Among many other bits of techno-trivia, I learned that my keyboard can’t send function key events to UEFI. I also learned that my logitech mouse sometimes is detected as (!) SATA storage during device enumeration at bootup. So, I’m sprucing up my desktop peripherals to steer clear of those issues. Let me explain…

Why I’m Sprucing Up My Desktop Peripherals

Function keys are helpful and even necessary during inital PC start for access to UEFI. They also drive many functions inside UEFI (e.g. F10 to “save & exit”). When the UEFI can’t read them, it’s anywhere from mildly annoying to maddening. My trusty old MS Comfort Curve 4000 (CC) is what’s known as a “composite USB HID device.” Alas, during POST and UEFI handoff, some PC firmware (including Asrock’s) handles only basic HID devices, not composite ones. To make that stuff work, in other words, I have to use a keyboard different from the CC. Sigh #1.

The older Logitech Unifying transceivers that work with mice and keyboards of that era also show another Asrock firmware quirk. They may sometimes (but not always) be recognized as SATA storage devices during first-time device enumeration. This threw me into an endless cycle of A6 POST errors on the B550 when I was trying to get the upstairs machine working last week. Here again, switching to a wired mouse fixed that issue. Sigh #2.

New Secure Boot, New Accoutrement

My fundamental problem is that I’m recycling old gear on a newer system. So it’s time to buy something new to bring it more in synch with the demands of modern UEFI, Secure Boot certificates, TPM 2.0 and suchlike. After walking thru my options with Copilot I’ve chosen a couple of Logitech items (I’m a long-time fan, and reviewed  lot of their peripherals in the 2000s for Tom’s Hardware):

  • Logitech Wavekeys keyboard (PN: YR0096) mostly matches the CC layout and feel, and is a basic HID device. Thus, its Fn keys should work properly in POST and UEFI.
  • In the same box, a Logi Bolt transceiver (xcvr PN: CU0021) which is supposedly superior to the old unifying xcvr, nor subject to mis-detection as a SATA device.
  • Logitech Signature M650 mouse (PN: MR0091) mostly matches the MS Mobile Mouse 4000 downstairs and the Logi mouse upstairs. Also works with Logi Bolt xcvr so I need only one transceiver for both devices.

I used the Bolt xcvr from the keyboard, so it came up instantly. I had to download and install the Logi Options+ app to get it to recognize the mouse through that same xcvr (it shipped with one of its own). But that was fast and easy, and the wireless link is quick and accurate. Alas, I got down on wireless keyboards back in the 2000s when I had a bad experience with transmission lag. If you type reasonably quickly (I’m at least 40 wpm or better) that’s not acceptable. So far, so good, with these Logitech devices.

Change is a watchword here in Windows-World. Like it or not (and I’m still figuring that out) my peripherals are changing. So are lots of others things. Adapt and thrive is the plan…

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Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card

Here in my house — Chez Tittel, that is — I have 11 computers running. Of that number, 10 have Secure Boot enabled and running. 8 have updated to the 2023 Secure Boot certificate authorities (aka 2023 CA) to replace the soon-to-be-obsolete 2011 CAs. Let’s call this status the Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card. Next, I will provide more details.

Presenting Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card

You can see that the report card takes the form of a table in three columns. (Open the lead-in graphic in its own browser tab to see the whole shebang.)  Col1 shows the machine name for each PC. Col2 indicates whether or not Secure Boot is enabled. Col3 covers whether or not the new 2023 CA is present or missing.

Here’s a breakdown, with percentages:

  • 10 of 11 machines have Secure Boot enables and running (~91%)
  • 8 of 11 machines have the new 2023 CA in their secure stores
  • 2 of 11 machines are waiting on WU to send them an update. It will add CA 2023 to their secure credentials. (2018 vintage X380 Yoga and the 2020 vintage X12 Hybrid Tablet.)
  • The only holdout is RyzenOfc, whose Asrock B550 motherboard won’t go into UEFI with the ancient NVIDIA GeForce 1070Ti currently installed. I’ve ordered a newer 4070 board and expect to complete the install process to enable Secure Boot and bring CA 2023 on board once it gets here.

Assessing a Mini-Fleet Experience

I was pretty surprised that the OEM PCs made working with Secure Boot and the 2023 CA update more or less routine. I only had to enable Secure Boot on a couple of machines, and the all of their update processes went smoothly. This involved machines from Lenovo (7) and one each from Dell and Asus.

The Asrock B550 PCs were a whole ‘nother story. I now know it’s at least partly because the old Pascal firmware on the 1070 GPUs doesn’t mesh well with UEFI in general. But I also now know that the B550 UEFI itself is a finicky and sometimes cantankerous beast.

Getting the first instance (Flo6, my production desktop) working with SB and 2023 CA  was close to the adventure of a lifetime. I sincerely hope that when the new GPU appears here at Chez Tittel, the second iteration will be easier, less vexing, and nowhere near as drawn-out as the first one was. We’ll see: here in Windows-World anything can happen — and often does!

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KB5074105 Brings On Secure Boot

Just when I’d more or less given up, along comes KB5074105 on January 29. In its “Normal rollout” fork, the first item to appear is entitled [Secure Boot]. That item (partly depicted above) also explicitly mentions boot manager updates for UEFI CA 2023. And indeed, after I installed and rebooted from that update, I was finally, finally able to get Secure Boot working on the Flo6 desktop. It ain’t necessarily easy or quick, but KB5074105 brings on Secure Boot capability to at least some machines that need it.

With Some Effort, KB5074105 Brings On Secure Boot

You’d think it would be as easy as falling off a log to get Secure Boot (SB) working after the update. You’d be wrong. I had to go through eight (8!) steps after that to set things to rights:

1. Reboot into UEFI and enable Secure Boot
After KB5074105 updated the boot binaries, I could finally toggle Secure Boot ON without triggering a pre‑GOP (graphics output protocol) stall. This was the first sign the trust chain was now compatible with the 2023 CA.

2. Switch Secure Boot Mode to Custom
This exposed the key‑management interface, allowing me to directly manipulate PK, KEK, db, and dbx. Standard mode hides these controls.

3. Install the factory default Secure Boot keys
Reloaded the OEM/Microsoft default PK, KEK, db, and dbx. This rebuilt the entire Secure Boot hierarchy from a known‑good, signed set.

4. Save and reboot to exit Setup Mode
Once the keys were installed, the firmware left Setup Mode and re‑entered User Mode, meaning Secure Boot enforcement was now active.

5. Boot Windows with Secure Boot enabled
Windows successfully validated its updated boot chain (thanks to KB5074105) and completed a full boot under Secure Boot for the first time on Flo6.

And That’s Still NOT the End of the Ride…

6. Rebuild the TPM trust state
Because Secure Boot changed the PCR profile, Windows had to re‑establish TPM‑sealed secrets. This required signing in with my password and letting Windows reseal keys.

7. Reprovision Windows Hello for each MSA
Both my primary and secondary MSAs needed fresh Hello containers because the TPM and Secure Boot trust anchors had changed. Each account required a password login followed by PIN setup.

8. Rebuild WAM tokens for Store/Xbox/MSA services
Once Hello was re‑established, the MS Web Account Manager (WAM) regenerated its token sets. This cleared the Xbox PIN loop and restored cloud‑service authentication. Indeed WAM allows apps to silently authenticate using Hello-based credentials.

A lot of this is new to me, because I’ve never had to set up SB on a PC before. My other PCs from Lenovo and Dell have done a fine job of doing it for me. This is the first time I’ve done it for myself… and it’s been much more of an adventure than I expected. Wow!

 

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Secure Boot Oddities Accumulate

Although I’m resigned to living without secure boot on the B550-based desktops here at Chez Tittel, that doesn’t stop me from trying other fixes from time to time. Indeed, I discovered a great thread about secure boot keys at ElevenForum, and learned more about what’s going on under the hood. Along the way, I gave myself a terrific scare as I saw more secure boot oddities accumulate. Here’s what happened…

Registry Key Change Helps Secure Boot Oddities Accumulate

One must provide Windows with a a couple of instrux to ask the OS to update secure boot key certificates, to wit:

Set-ItemProperty -Path “HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecureBoot” -Name “AvailableUpdates” -Value 0x40

Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName “\Microsoft\Windows\PI\Secure-Boot-Update”

One is then instructed to reboot Windows twice to get those instructions to work as they’re intended to. What it doesn’t say is that strange things might happen before the first reboot occurs.

Black Screen, No UEFI — No Nothin!

I about had heart failure when I rebooted my PC this morning and the Flo6 came up black with no normal boot sequence. No Asrock logo, no instructions to hit Del or F1 to load EFI, no F11 for boot menu. There’s not much one can do to fix a Windows PC that won’t do anything, short of taking it into a shop.

So I turned off the power supply, then hit the power button for 10 seconds to make sure all the capacitors got discharged. Then I took a break and walked away from the machine for 10 minutes. Then I powered on again. Phew! This time, the Asrock logo appeared, and it booted into Windows 11.  To my great relief, the second reboot was no big deal, and I was glad.

Here in Windows-World, you can make big changes without incurring at least some risk. This morning, I wondered if I’d bitten off more than I could chew. I even wondered if I’d bricked the Flo6. Thank goodness, I had not. I’ll take that as a win, even though you can see in the lead-in graphic that 2023 keys remain absent on this PC. Go figure!

 

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Returning Spurious Reclaimables Removed

For the past couple of years, I’ve watched various Windows updates and upgrades introduce and re-introduce what I call “spurious reclaimables.” These are windows packages that show up in the component store that (a) don’t need to be there and (b) refuse removal using dism /online …. /StartComponentCleanup. Just yesterday, Copilot helped me figure out how to yet again make them go away. That’s because I saw a familiar set of returning spurious reclaimables removed on the ARM-based ThinkPad T14s Gen 6.

Getting Returning Spurious Reclaimables Removed

There are two such packages in this mix, each with characteristic, fairly unique substrings — namely “RollupFix” and “FodMetadata.” So that’s what I used to find that stuff in the package store:

dism /online /get-packages /format:table | findstr /i “RollupFix”
dism /online /get-packages /format:table | findstr /i “FodMetadata”

Those commands let me find the precise package names that I would go on to use to remove the spurious ones from the package store. Indeed, Windows 11 24/25H2 continues to surprise even seasoned Windows hands with its servicing behavior—especially on ARM64 systems. Here’s a short but hopefully illuminating dive into how ARM64 handles staged vs. installed packages, and why some packages appear removable even when they aren’t.

Working Through the Process: RollupFix

Here’s my starting point — namely, two RollupFix Packages. One is staged and the other installed. On the T14s laptopn  DISM /get-packages listed two versions of the RollupFix package:
– A staged version: 26100.1743.1.3
– An installed version: 26100.7674.1.3
Both appeared to be reclaimable. So I started with the older, staged version, and provided a DISM command to remove it:

dism /online /remove-package /packagename:Package_for_
RollupFix~31bf3856ad364e35~arm64~~26100.1743.1.3

(Note I stuck a CRLF into that line to make it lay out better. To cut’n’paste that item, stick into Notepad and turn it into a one-liner.)

DISM happily complied with that command and responded with: “Processing 1 of 1 – Removing package … The operation completed successfully.” So far, so good. But the next step revealed something interesting, as I attempted to remove the newer, installed RollupFix package (same syntax as above, new package name).

This time, DISM responded with an error message, to wit: “Error: 0x800f0825 — the package is permanent or not applicable.” That means once the staged version got removed, the installed version became the baseline and couldn’t be removed. This mirrors AMD64 behavior, though ARM64 expresses things more forcefully. Removing the superseded version effectively locks in the newer one, making it “permanent” and non-removable.

Further into the Process: FodMetadata

The T14s also offered up two versions of the FOD metadata servicing package, one staged, the other installed:
– Staged: 10.0.26100.1743
– Installed: 10.0.26100.7674
Again I started with the staged version. This time DISM responded with Error 0x800F0805 “the staged package is already gone.” ARM64 appears to auto-clean the staged FOD metadata package when the staged RollupFix package is removed.

That’s a subtle but important difference from AMD64, where the FOD metadata package is removed automatically only when the installed RollupFix is removed. Thus, removing the installed version worked as it should, and that operation completed successfully.

Final Check: Clean Component Store

When I ran a followup /analyzecomponent store check in DISM after those various attempted and successful removals, I got clean store billing, as reported in these output lines for that command:

Number of Reclaimable Packages: 0
Component Store Cleanup Recommended: No

That means the component store is clean, and there are no more reclaimable packages, spurious or otherwise, to get rid of. That’s what I like to see! You can see further confirmation in the lead-in graphic which shows only “Installed” versions for the two packages that previouly included older, obsolete staged versions prior to the cleanup moves I described above.

 

 

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Understanding El-Cheapo Windows Licenses

Every so often, a new round of bargain‑basement Windows license deals makes the rounds. You’ve seen them: Windows 11 Pro for ten bucks, Windows 10 Pro for even less. They pop up on StackSocial, StackCommerce, and a handful of deal‑driven tech sites. And like clockwork, the obvious question arises: Is this for real, or too good to be true? Neither and both: indeed, understanding el-cheapo Windows licenses hits both sides of this common wisdom.

More On Understanding El-Cheapo Windows Licenses

As someone who’s been around the Microsoft ecosystem for a long time — and who has more legit keys than I’ll ever need thanks to MVP status — I find the whole phenom fascinating. Not because I need another license, but because these offers sit right at the intersection of Microsoft’s licensing rules, its activation infrastructure, and the gray‑market economy surrounding both.

Here’s the key (pun intended): activation and licensing are not the same. Activation is a technical handshake with Microsoft’s servers. Licensing is a legal framework that governs how a key is properly obtained and used. Those two systems overlap, but they don’t enforce each other as tightly as many expect and assume.

Most $10 keys fall into one of three buckets. The first is unused OEM keys pulled from bulk hardware purchases. Perfectly valid keys, never activated on their original devices, but not transferable under Microsoft’s rules. The second bucket is decommissioned or oversold MAKs (multiple activation keys) — volume license keys with high activation counts that get resold repeately. They activate until the pool runs dry. The third bucket is region‑restricted retail keys, bought cheaply in low‑cost markets and resold elsewhere. They activate just fine, and Microsoft rarely retroactively enforces region boundaries.

None of these keys is counterfeit. They’re simply not authorized for retail distribution and sales. And that’s the crux of the matter. A key can be technically valid and still not legitimate under Microsoft’s licensing terms. That’s why you see disclaimers like “Microsoft may deactivate this license” — something never attached to a true retail key.

Why Not Stop This Madness?

So why doesn’t Microsoft shut this down? Because enforcement is aimed at organizations, not individuals.  Say a corporate MAK pool gets audited and is found to be leaking keys. Then, the consequences fall on the organization that holds the license — not the end user who bought a $10 key online. Microsoft’s activation infrastructure is built for compatibility and ease of deployment, not aggressive policing. As long as the upstream license pool stays quiet, the key will likely keep working.

That’s why you see technically savvy users reporting years of trouble‑free activation. They’re not wrong. They’re simply describing the operational reality, not the licensing reality.

In the end, these cheap keys occupy a curious middle ground: not fake, not fully legitimate, but functional and low‑risk for individual buyers. They’re a reminder that Windows licensing is strict on paper, pragmatic in practice, and full of gray areas that only get more interesting the deeper you dig.

Here in Windows-World one perforce gets comfortable with gray areas. This one seems a bit more gray and shadowy than most, but there you have it!

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Copilot: Driver’s Education

If you read yesterday’s blog, you already know that I spent most of the weekend with my Flo6 desktop in UEFI, booting, or at the command line in WinRE/WinPE. On the other PC next to my desk chair, I keep a Lenovo P16 Gen1 Thinkpad. I was running Copilot on that PC, looking for insight into making Secure Boot work on the Flo6. Simply put, you can’t ask for help in Windows when that OS isn’t running. During that process I ended up in class for Copilot: driver’s education became quite a concern as I had difficulty scrolling down to read longish replies to my prompts and queries.

What Copilot Driver’s Education Is About

Turns out my scrolling attempts were misguided. I didn’t really understand how the touchpad on the P16 works. As you can see in the prompt window I’m using in this post for a lead-in graphic, the P16 touchpad is  more oriented to gestures than to driving screen controls.

While I was working over the weekend, I simply popped in a wired mouse — complete with scroll wheel — and used that to speed scrolling while interrogating Copilot on the P16. After I had time to dig in a bit deeper, I learned that a two-finger gesture works for scrolling that touchpad quite nicely (two-finger sweep up to scroll down, down to scroll up — shades of Doc in the movie Cars).

Hah! I’ve been using Copilot since it first showed up over two years ago (June 2023) and didn’t know that this till this weekend. Probably because I still mostly drive with a mouse and not a touchpad. Now I know. Here in Windows-World, it’s the little things that sometimes make a big difference…

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