Category Archives: Recent Activity

ASUS Snapdragon Shows Odd Boot Anomaly

Here is a puzzle that took me longer than I care to admit to fully unpack. I built a recovery USB — clean DISM export, proper bootloader, everything by the book — set it first in the UEFI boot order, and rebooted an ASUS A14 Zenbook expecting to land in a familiar Windows Recovery Environment. Instead, I got the ASUS recovery stub. Every single time. I moved the USB higher in the boot order. I tried the firmware boot menu. I watched the machine apparently select the USB and then, silently and without apology, drop me into ASUS’s own mini-recovery UI anyway. The drive was not defective. The boot order was correct. The machine just did not care. This is my reason for saying: ASUS Snapdragon shows odd boot anomaly.

Getting Past ASUS Snapdragon Shows Odd Boot Anomaly

What I kept landing in was not Microsoft’s WinRE. It was ASUS’s recovery stub from firmware. It’s a minimal launcher, typically just a few hundred megabytes, that presents three or four tiles: Reset this PC, ASUS Recovery, and Advanced options. It looks vaguely like WinRE. It shares some ancestry with winre.wim. But it is ASUS’s gatekeeper, not Microsoft’s recovery environment, and it exists specifically to intercept the boot process before you can get anywhere else.

Here is the mechanism. ASUS, like most Tier-1 OEMs, configures its UEFI firmware with a hardcoded recovery boot path that fires during the BDS (Boot Device Selection) phase. It hits before the standard UEFI boot manager even looks at the user’s boot order. The firmware scans the internal NVMe for a partition stamped with a specific GPT partition type GUID — not the ordinary Microsoft Basic Data GUID, but a dedicated Recovery GUID or a custom OEM namespace. When it finds that partition, it hands control to the stub immediately. Your carefully ordered boot menu is consulted afterward, if at all. The USB was never really in the running.

Secure Boot adds a second layer of obstruction. Let’s say your hand-built USB carries an unsigned or self-signed bootloader (common with DISM-assembled media not signed against Microsoft’s KEK). Then,  the firmware rejects it silently and falls through to the next trusted entry in its internal list. That entry is the ASUS stub. So even when the BDS phase does get as far as examining external media, an unsigned USB is invisible. The machine looks like it’s ignoring you. It is, technically, but for a specific cryptographic reason (yes, really).

The WIM Recompression Tax

Once you understand why your DIY USB is being locked out, it helps to understand what the OEM actually ships in its place. It also explains why making a genuine ASUS recovery drive takes the better part of an hour. It starts with WIM compression. Microsoft’s stock winre.wim uses LZX compression and typically lands somewhere between 500 MB and 1 GB on disk. Manageable. Sensible. But ASUS’s customised image, once you add the recovery launcher, platform drivers, UI payloads, and potentially a full factory image, can balloon to several gigabytes of uncompressed data before anyone has touched the compression knob.

When you kick off the “Create ASUS Recovery Drive” process in MyASUS, what actually happens under the hood is a DISM /Export-Image /Compress:max operation (or its functional equivalent)  applied to an enormous source WIM. Maximum LZX compression, and on newer builds you may even see solid-block LZMS compression, which squeezes harder but runs even slower.

Here’s the critical detail: WIM compression in DISM is largely single-threaded. It reads every file, applies the compression algorithm, writes the output, and verifies integrity as it goes, all on one logical core (yes, really). On an otherwise fast NVMe-equipped laptop, that process still takes 40 to 55 minutes, not because the machine is slow, but because the algorithm is doing an enormous amount of intense, serialised work. The hardware isn’t at fault; the workload is.

Getting to USB-Based (Alternate) Boot

Here’s where the rubber meets the road. Getting external media to boot on an ASUS machine requires working around the firmware, not just the boot order. There are two reliable paths. First: disable Secure Boot in UEFI setup (DEL at POST, not F8 — more on that distinction in a moment). With Secure Boot off, unsigned bootloaders no longer get silently rejected. Second: on older platforms with CSM support, enabling CSM forces a legacy BIOS boot path that bypasses the UEFI BDS handoff to the stub.

The Bottom Line: Build Custom Recovery Media

Whether you use the MS supplied “Create a recovery drive” facility, or turn to the MyASUS toolbox to do likewise, the best way to protect an ASUS Zenbook A14 is to build recovery media from that PC. As I learned through a series of failed recovery attempts with other, supposedly generic, all-purpose recovery media, that stuff doesn’t fly inside the Zenbook’s firmware envelope.

Learn from my mistake, and follow this advice as soon as  you can. Otherwise, you too, will fumble around until you find the MyASUS in WinRE tool that does cloud-based image reconstruction instead. If all you want is WinRE running a command prompt, that’s not a good alternative. Do it now: don’t delay!

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Bizarre ASUS Disk Layout Is Intentional

Wow! Wow! Wow! What an adventure I just went through. After examining the weird, seemingly fragmented disk layout shown in the lead-in graphic, I went nuts. I decided to clean install Windows 11. That’s when I learned a bunch of stuff I didn’t want to know. Chief among those things (more to follow): the bizarre ASUS disk layout is intentional. Indeed, it came back after typical clean install manuevers failed repeatedly. Ultimately, I used the “My ASUS in WinRE for USB” app to bring the unit back to life.

Why Say: Bizarre ASUS Disk Layout Is Intentional?

Short answer: because it came back on its own after running a cloud restore on the Windows 11 image on the Zenbook A14. Longer answer: the unit simply wouldn’t boot into any kind of standard recovery media that I could build by hand. I wasted more than a day trying to brute force my way into a clean install, only to realize ASUS has barred the “boot to USB” door very tightly and narrowly. Indeed, I’m very, very glad that I was able to get the unit up and running again. I’d been contemplating a run to a nearby repair shop. I’m glad it didn’t come to that — but it was close!

I’m not sure WTF is going on, that ASUS needs nine OEM partitions on its SSD drive (the 16MB one is undoubtedly the MSR). But I’ll be darned if I was able to figure out how to get rid of them. I think there are two recovery partitions (reagentc says it’s tied to Partition 15) because one is for normal Windows use, the other for ASUS’s no-doubt murky purposes.

If It Ain’t Broke…

Honestly, I should’ve known better. The unit was behaving and peforming as expected. Just because I didn’t — and still don’t — like what I see for disk layout, doesn’t mean I should’ve taken the clean install route. Now I know better.

A painful lesson learned, a day-and-a-half spent chasing phantoms. Sounds like my idea of a good time. Here in Windows-World, I take my jollies where I can find them. Think I’ve had enough of those to last me for a while, though…

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Explainer: Secure Boot Chain of Trust

Here’s an uncomfortable, seldom considered truth: your operating system isn’t the first thing that runs when you power on your PC. The firmware goes first. Then the bootloader. Then the OS kernel. Malware creators figured this out a long time ago. Get in early enough — before the OS loads — and you can own a machine invisibly, surviving reboots, reinstalls, and even antivirus scans. All this explains why the secure boot chain of trust is vital to modern Windows security.

The threat is real and it’s present right now. BlackLotus, a UEFI bootkit sold on criminal forums, made headlines in 2023 for bypassing Secure Boot on fully patched Windows 11 systems. BootHole exposed a critical flaw in GRUB2’s boot process that affected both Linux and Windows. PKFail (2024) revealed that dozens of device vendors had shipped products using a leaked “do not ship” test Platform Key — meaning the root of the entire trust hierarchy was compromised straight out of the box. Then, in January 2025, ESET researchers disclosed CVE-2024-7344: a Microsoft-signed UEFI recovery application that could silently load unsigned bootkit code — on any UEFI system, regardless of whether Secure Boot was enabled. Microsoft pulled the vulnerable binaries in the January 14, 2025 Patch Tuesday update.

Boot-time attacks aren’t theoretical. They’re happening. Under-standing Secure Boot’s chain of trust is the first step toward knowing whether your defenses are actually holding.

Understanding the Secure Boot Chain of Trust

Think of the chain of trust as a series of checkpoints at the border. Each checkpoint must vouch for the next before anything is allowed through. No vouching, no entry, and the boot process stops dead.

In technical terms: every component in the boot sequence verifies the digital signature of the next component cryptographically before handing off execution. The firmware checks the bootloader. The bootloader checks the OS kernel. The kernel checks drivers. If any link in that chain can’t be verified — wrong signature, no signature, a signature that’s been revoked — the process stops. Your PC refuses to proceed rather than run untrusted code. That’s the whole point. Always safe means never sorry, even if it also means a PC that won’t fire up and run.

The chain only works, of course, if the first link is trustworthy. That’s where the UEFI key hierarchy comes in.

The Key Players: PK, KEK, db, and dbx

UEFI Secure Boot manages trust through four interlocking databases baked into your firmware. Get familiar with them — they come up constantly whenever something goes wrong at boot time.

Key / Database Full Name Role
PK Platform Key Root of trust. Set by the hardware manufacturer. Controls who can update KEK.
KEK Key Exchange Key Authorized to update the signature databases (db and dbx).
db Signature Database Hashes and certificates of trusted bootloaders allowed to execute.
dbx Forbidden Signatures Database Revoked signatures and hashes. Anything here is blocked unconditionally.

The PK sits at the top. Your motherboard manufacturer owns it. Below the PK, the KEK authorizes who gets to update the lists of trusted and forbidden signatures. In practice, Microsoft functions as the de facto Secure Boot Certificate Authority for the consumer PC ecosystem. Nearly every machine you buy ships with Microsoft’s certificates pre-loaded in db — exactly why CVE-2024-7344 was so broadly dangerous. A legitimately Microsoft-signed binary became a usable attack vector!

Worth Knowing: PKFail and the Test Key Problem

In 2024, the PKFail vulnerability revealed that over 200 device models from multiple vendors shipped with a Platform Key originally marked “DO NOT TRUST” — a sample key from AMI’s reference firmware that was never meant to leave the lab. When your PK is public knowledge, the entire root of trust collapses.

How the Chain Is Created at Boot Time

Power on your PC, and here’s what actually happens — fast, invisible, and mostly taken for granted.

  1. The UEFI firmware initializes hardware and activates Secure Boot mode.
  2. The firmware reads the bootloader from the EFI System Partition and checks its signature against db. It also checks against dbx — if it’s there, execution stops immediately.
  3. The signed bootloader (Windows Boot Manager, for example) takes over and verifies the OS kernel’s signature using its own embedded certificates.
  4. The kernel loads and verifies signed drivers. On Windows, this is enforced through Driver Signature Enforcement — unsigned kernel-mode code is blocked by default.

Every handoff is cryptographically verified before it happens. Compromise any link — plant an unsigned binary, exploit a signed-but-vulnerable loader, sneak past a misconfigured dbx — and an attacker owns your machine below the OS waterline. That’s precisely the attack surface that BlackLotus, BootHole, and CVE-2024-7344 each exploited in different ways.

Maintaining a Strong Chain of Trust

Secure Boot isn’t a “set it and forget it” control. Maintaining a healthy chain of trust requires ongoing attention from both Microsoft and from you.

The most important maintenance lever is the dbx — the blocklist. When a bootloader is found vulnerable (as happened with a batch of 2011-era Microsoft-signed binaries in 2023, and again with the CVE-2024-7344 binaries in January 2025), Microsoft issues dbx updates through Patch Tuesday. Your firmware then refuses to execute those specific binaries even if they’re somehow placed on the system. Keeping Windows Update current is how those revocations reach your PC.

Firmware updates matter just as much. Vulnerabilities in the UEFI firmware itself require OEM-supplied updates delivered via Windows Update or manufacturer tools. The NSA and CISA have both issued guidance recommending that organizations periodically audit their Secure Boot configuration — confirming the correct keys are enrolled, the dbx is current, and no rogue Platform Keys are in place (a lesson PKFail drove home hard).

Complementing Secure Boot is the TPM’s Measured Boot capability. While Secure Boot enforces what can execute, Measured Boot records cryptographic measurements of everything that did execute into TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). Remote attestation tools can then verify those measurements after the fact. Think of Secure Boot as the bouncer at the door; Measured Boot is the security camera logging who actually got in.

Why the Chain of Trust REALLY Matters

Secure Boot isn’t perfect — BlackLotus, BootHole, PKFail, and CVE-2024-7344 all proved that. But “not perfect” is a long way from “useless.” It raises the cost and complexity of boot-level attacks significantly, and when the ecosystem keeps the revocation databases current, it closes known attack paths quickly.

Do yourself a favor: open System Information (msinfo32), find BIOS Mode (should read UEFI) and Secure Boot State (should read On). If either is wrong, fix it. Keep your firmware updated. Keep Windows updated. The chain of trust is only as strong as its weakest, most-neglected link — and that link is usually sitting right between the keyboard and the chair. Here in Windows-World keeping track of key security concerns is darned important. The Secure Boot chain of trust should be at the top of everyone’s list.

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Another Toolset for Secure Boot Checks

Yesterday, I read my way through the latest AskWoody newsletter. In Susan Bradley’s article “Check Those Browsers” I found reference to Secure Boot checks: “If you merely need to run a script to check the UEFI KEK, DB, and DBX Secure Boot variables, you can use this one.” Because the source wasn’t directly named, I followed that link to access cjee21’s scripts entitled Check-UEFISecureBootVariables at GitHub. And there, I found another toolset for Secure Boot Checks — and a good one, too.

Why Grab Another Toolset for Secure Boot Checks?

You can (and probably should) visit GitHub to grab cjee21’s Check-UEFISecureBootVariables. At the time of writing it’s sitting at 226 stars and was updated two days prior — such active maintenance on a niche diagnostic utility is a good thing. This is the tool you want when your first question is “What do I actually have on this machine?”

Its orientation is forensic and inspection-first. It surfaces everything inside the UEFI Secure Boot variable store: PK, KEK, DB, DBX, event logs, and XML dumps of the full variable contents. Most people working a CA-2023 compliance problem have never actually looked at those variables directly. This tool makes that straightforward.

Two specific components stand out for CA-2023 work:

  • Check EFI file info.cmd — This is the direct answer to what Get-AuthenticodeSignature lacks. Point it at an .efi file and it explicitly tells you which CA signed it (CA-2011 or CA-2023), along with the SVN, SBAT level, and raw version data. That’s the specific question you must answer, and this specific tool answers it.
  • Scan ESP for revoked files.cmd — This one scans EFI binaries on a drive against the live Microsoft DBX revocation list. If you’re checking USB boot media for compliance — a Ventoy stick, a WinPE drive, a rescue environment — this is the fastest way to know whether anything on it has been revoked.

Don’t Forget the Garlin Scripts (ElevenForum)

Cjee21’s scripts show and tell you what you’ve got. Garlin’s ElevenForum Scripts tell you what to do about it. This pair of scripts: Check_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 and Update_UEFI-CA2023.ps1, are action-oriented where cjee21’s tool is inspection-oriented. At 38 GitHub stars it’s a smaller project, but it was updated approximately two weeks before writing and recent commits show active refinement, including a fix for a bug in SVN signature data ordering. The associated forum thread is VERY active, and usually gains 2-3 pages per day.

The workflow is deliberately linear and guided: run Check_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 to assess your current CA-2023 status, then run Update_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 to fix whatever it finds. The scripts source certificates from \Windows\System32\SecureBootUpdates and the official Microsoft Secure Boot Objects repository, so you’re not pulling from unofficial or unverified sources.

A few things make the Garlin scripts especially helpful:

  • USB removable media support — It handles boot file updates for USB recovery media like Macrium Reflect drives and similar tools. This is a gap that most documentation quietly ignores.
  • Broader architecture coverage — x64, x86, arm64, and arm are all supported, which gives it wider applicability than you might expect from a community script.
  • Accessible for non-specialists — The guided, opinionated workflow means you don’t need deep UEFI expertise to use it. The script makes the decisions; you confirm them.

Complementary, Not Competitive

Again: the cjee21 scripts show you what’s what with Secure Boot on a Windows PC, at a deep level of detail. More than many of us want to know, in fact. The Garlin scripts tell you what to do about your current status, and help you set things right on installed systems and for bootable media.  A great combination, well worth exercising. Give them a try, if you haven’t already.

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MS Readies Copilot Key Remap

How often do I use Copilot? Multiple times a day, sometimes for hours at a go. How often do I use the Copilot key on a Copilot+ PC to access same? NEVER (I tried it out on an early laptop, saw it worked, and never used it again). I’m pretty sure most other users work the same way. Thus it came as no surprise and something of a relief to read news that MS Readies Copilot key remap in some upcoming Windows 11 update.

Why MS Readies Copilot Key Remap

This plan surfaced in a recently published Microsoft Support Note entitled ” Understand updates to the Copilot key on Windows devices,” Copilot finds no publication date for this item, but guesstimates it appeared on May 18  (yesterday, as I write this post).

Here’s how that note starts out:

Starting in 2024, hardware manufactures released new Windows 11 devices that include a dedicated Copilot key that provides quick access to Copilot experiences in Windows. This Copilot key sometimes replaces the Right Ctrl key or Context Menu key on select devices.

Customers who rely on the Right Ctrl key or Context menu key for keyboard shortcuts or assistive technologies (such as screen readers) experienced some challenges to their workflows when using these devices.

The important info comes next, and explains how things will work once this update appears:

A Windows 11 update will ship later this year that will add a setting option to let you remap the Copilot key to act as the Context menu key or Right Ctrl key. When available, you can find this setting in: Settings > Bluetooth & devices > Keyboard

What Does Copilot Key Remap Mean?

It’s an implicit ACK from MS that some (or many) people don’t use the key. Better, however, it’s a means for those who need the key that used to sit where the Copilot key now rests will get an official way to restore it (or rather, its functions as the Right CTRL or Context menu key) on their keyboards. Good enough for me!

When will this appear? MS isn’t saying yet. But they wouldn’t dangle it out there if they weren’t already working on it. My best guess is months, not longer. I’ll keep an eye on things and let you know when more news is available.

And here’s a concluding irony: I’m current working on a Logitech  Wave Keys keyboard on the Flo6 desktop. No Copilot key here, and I don’t miss it at all, not even one little bit.

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Intel DSA Remains Driver Install Clickmeister

I just realized that DSA was MIA on my ThinkPad X12 Gen 1 Detachable Tablet. So I installed it, then ran it. It found 3 drivers in need of updates on that device: Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and (Xe) Graphics. In updating them, I observed that the  Intel Driver and Support Assistant (Intel DSA) remains driver install clickmeister supreme. Let me explain…

Why say: Intel DSA Remains Driver Install Clickmeister?

It’s long been my observation that using DSA requires lots of mouse clicks. This time around, installing the three drivers shown in the lead-in screencap required at least 24 mouse clicks. For the record, those drivers were (numbers at right count clicks for each one):

  • Wireless Bluetooth Drivers (9)
  • 11th-14th Gen Processor Graphics (10)
  • Wi-Fi Drivers (5)

This time around it actually took me 4 additional mouse clicks to get from item 2 to item 3, because I was installing the GPU driver for the first time. Thus, I had to reboot my system, because DSA got “stuck” on “installing” for item 2, and wouldn’t advance to item 3. Sigh. I didn’t count those “extra” clicks in my reported total.

Achieving Intel Driver Update Silence

Believe it or not, that’s the title of a blog I posted on April 27, 2023. That was another time when the sheer number of clicks involved in running DSA hit me hard. It remains noticeable. Today, it struck me as excessive. So I’m formulating this plea to the Intel DSA developers:

Please add a silent mode switch to DSA. Let users tell the tool to run the installs without requiring minutes of babysitting to get through routine maintenance.

I wonder if anybody is listening. Then, I wonder if they’ll respond. Here in Windows-World the silence can sometimes be deafening. Let’s see what happens, shall we?

 

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MCT Now Delivers CA-2023 Bootloader

There’s the thing about working in Windows IT long enough.  You develop a finely tuned instinct for when something sounds simple but absolutely isn’t. Microsoft has been gradually rolling out Secure Boot CA-2023 support, and the boots-on-the-ground question I needed to answer was about as plain-English as it gets: is the bootable USB drive sitting on my desk actually CA-2023 compliant, or not? A yes-or-no question. It took me a while, but I finally got the answer: As of 4/30/2026, MCT now delivers CA-2023 bootloader and compliant WIM (or, in this case, “split WIM” aka .swm) files.

Determining That MCT Now Delivers CA-2023 Bootloader

At first, I got sidetracked by Copilot. It recommended the PowerShell command Get-AuthenticodeSignature to check status. Alas, the bootloader is “dual-signed” which means it’s signed with BOTH CA-2011 AND CA-2023 certificates. And because the 2011 gets picked up first, the PS command reports it ONLY as signed with the older certificate. It was indeed signed with CA-2023 (and compliant) but my check couldn’t tell me that. Sigh.

So I changed gears and used Garlin’s wonderful (and entirely accurate) Check_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 script from ElevenForum. You can see its output in the lead-in graphic. In a nutshell, it shows the USB stick as CA-2023 compliant. Flo6 ditto, with CA-2011 revoked.

But First, You Must Be Punished…

I dithered around with Copilot for an hour or so trying to “replace” the CA-2011 bootx64.efi file with a CA-2023 compliant version. Until I switched to the Garlin script, I didn’t realize already WAS CA-2023 compliant. That’s when I figured out that indeed MCT now provides CA-2023 compliant bootloaders and image files.

How so? That definitive answer comes from the afore-named PowerShell diagnostic script  — a tool specifically designed to tell you, clearly and unambiguously, whether your Windows system and its boot media are CA-2023 ready. The syntax for that check is:

.\check_UEFI-CA2023.ps1 -bootmedia -verbose

My recommendation: run the Check_UEFI… script to check your system, and bootable USBs. Even if you’re confident that your MCT media is fresh and your system is current, Garlin’s script is the only way to get a clean yes-or-no on your specific configuration. Think of it as the verification step that turns “I think I’m good” into “I know I’m good.”

Between MCT now generating compliant media by default and a trustworthy diagnostic tool available to confirm it, the CA-2023 story is getting meaningfully less murky. We’re not all the way there yet — but for once, things are actually trending in the right direction. I’ll take it. Here in Windows-World, that’s about as good as it gets!

 

 

 

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Troubleshooting Flo6 S3 Sleep Oddities

Now that I’m back to a normal work pattern, I couldn’t help but notice that the power button on my Flo6/MSI B550 Tomahawk PC was blinking this morning. That means it’s sleeping and needs a touch to wake itself back  up. Indeed, that blinking power button is the unmistakable signature of S3 sleep — Suspend to RAM — where the system cuts power to everything except memory. Nobody asked it to do that. Time to find out why it thought that was a good idea. Hence, I found myself troubleshooting Flo6 S3 sleep oddities.

Troubleshooting Flo6 S3 Sleep Oddities: Step 1

My first move with any uninvited sleep behavior is to open an elevated command prompt and run powercfg /a. This dumps a plain-English summary of every sleep state the OS currently considers available — and, crucially, tells you which ones are actually enabled. The lead-in graphic shows what Flo6 reported.

That told me everything I needed to know at a glance. S3 was alive and well. Hibernate was also active. Windows had a full menu of power-down options available to it, and apparently it was helping itself. The next question was: what power plan setting was pulling the trigger?

Step 2: Drilling deeper

To see exactly what the current power scheme was telling Windows to do with sleep, I queried the sleep sub-group directly with powercfg /query SCHEME_CURRENT SUB_SLEEP. The output is verbose, so here’s the relevant section I was hunting for:

0x00004650 is 18,000 decimal — 5 hours on AC power. So Windows was faithfully sleeping Flo6 after 5 hours of perceived inactivity, exactly as I’d told it to in recovering from a recent, ill-advised troubleshooting test that reset all my sleep options. Nothing malicious, nothing mysterious. Just a setting I’d explicitly configured sitting where I’d put it, also wrong. Time to kill it.

Pulling the Plug on the Sleep/Wake Timers

I wanted three things gone: the Sleep After timer, Hybrid Sleep, and Wake Timers. Setting any timeout value to 0 disables it. I ran the following commands, covering both AC and DC (battery) power states for completeness, even though Flo6 is a desktop that will never run on battery:

As a belt-and-suspenders measure, I also went into Device Manager, expanded the Universal Serial Bus controllers node, and for each USB Root Hub, opened Properties > Power Management and unchecked Allow the computer to turn off this device to save power. USB Selective Suspend has a well-documented history of nudging systems toward sleep states in ways that aren’t immediately obvious from power plan settings alone. Worth the two minutes it takes to disable it across the board.

The EC Reset: Clearing the Firmware’s Memory

OS-level changes are necessary, but they don’t always flush stale power-state data that’s been cached at the firmware level. The MAG B550 Tomahawk MAX has an Embedded Controller that can hold onto a previous power state even after you’ve changed every relevant Windows setting. The fix is straightforward: shut Flo6 down cleanly, flip the PSU switch off, unplug the AC cord, then hold the case power button for 15 to 30 seconds. This drains the residual charge and forces the EC to reinitialize from scratch. Reconnect everything, power on, and let the board POST fresh. It’s a small step, but it closes a gap that software alone can’t address.

Verdict: Flo6 Should Stay Awake

Hopefully, Flo6 makes it through the night — and several nights after that — without a single uninvited nap. No blinking power button at 6 AM, no dead monitors, no manual wake required. For extra confidence, I’ve got a scheduled Task Scheduler job logging system uptime to a text file every hour overnight. If S3 ever comes back uninvited, I’ll have a timestamp trail to work from. IMO, one week’s worth of clean logs is good enough for me to call this one closed.

If I’ve missed anything, the blinking power button will be back. I hope not, but here in Windows-World anything is possible. If it’s not “case closed” I’ll report back with an addendum here. Fingers crossed that won’t be needed…

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Resuming Work After Week-long Absence

OK, then. We dropped onto the runway about 20 minutes early last evening. Wife Dina and I returned from a trip to Boston, to watch son Gregory trot across the stage at Emerson College’s Wang Theater to pick up his diploma and graduate. It was quite a trip in many ways. This morning, I’m back at my desk, resuming work after week-long absence. So far, it’s mostly two things: catch-up and clean-up. Let me explain…

What’s Involved: Resuming Work After Week-long Absence

Here’s the drill:
1. run winget upgrade –all — include-unknown to catch all pending updates that winget can handle (7 items)
2. run PatchMyPC Home Updater to catch other stuff that WinGet doesn’t (Revo Uninstaller, in this particular case)
3. run PC Manager deep cleanup (3.2GB found/1.1 GB cleaned) and unCleaner (2.5 GB found, 2.1 GB cleaned)
4. Because today is Patch Tuesday for May 2026, I also applied all pending monthly updates (2 for Defender, 1 for .NET Framework, and the usual monthly MSRT).

All that stuff is pretty easy and straightforward. I did have to reboot, though, because updates via WinGet and PatchMyPC didn’t proceed properly. Something apparently gummed up my runtime. Fixed with the tried-and-true strategy of “Try a reboot, if Windows is balky.” Add a second restart after the Patch Tuesday updates completed, just for grins.

Now, the Real Work Begins…

Next I have to plow through about a thousand email messages that piled up while were off having fun and making family history. That will probably take me the rest of the day. Then I can start updating the rest of the fleet. Wish me luck!

To cap things off, here’s a photo of Gregory proudly presenting his diploma amidst absolute chaos on Boston Common (across the street from Emerson College) after the ceremony ended. Cheers to him, and all of us!

 

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Troubleshooter Test Wrecks Sleep/Wake Settings

I have to laugh. I was poking around yesterday trying to see if MS had updated the old Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool for power options. It hasn’t so I accidentally fired off the old tool and let it run. Upon completion it told me it had “fixed” some things. This morning my experiment bit me on the hindquarters. Instead of starting up after a keyboard press or mouse click, I got …. nothing. I had to press the Power Button to wake up the system, after which all worked as expected. Alas, my troubleshooter test wrecks sleep/wake settings, and I had to go into Power Options to make things right again. Sigh.

Why Say: Troubleshooter Test Wrecks Sleep/Wake Settings?

What the troubleshooter “fixed” flew in the face of how I wanted my system to behave. When I asked Copilot what happened, it explained it as a kind of “own goal” resulting from running the tool. Its explanation is illuminating and a little humiliating for yours truly:

…the troubleshooter on its way out the door silently overrode a deliberate user setting, caused a real problem, and left no log entry explaining what it changed. That’s a tidy illustration of why automated “fixers” that don’t disclose what they’re changing are a liability.

True enough. Fixing the problem took only a few seconds:

1. Select Power Options from Control Panel
2. Click “Change advanced power settings”
3. Navigate to “USB Settings,” then “USB selective suspend setting”
4. Change both “On battery” and “Plugged in” from “Enabled” to “Disabled”

This keeps mouse and keyboard awake so either can wake the PC when it does something. That’s what I want. That’s what I got. And alas, that’s what the troubleshoot undid for me when it ran yesterday. It wanted to save power and that’s what selective suspend does.

Here in Windows-World there’s enough going on that I don’t need to create problems for myself. But that doesn’t stop me from doing it occasionally anyway. But now it’s fixed and I’m aware that I shouldn’t run msdt.exe unless I really need it. My exploration/experiment reminded me that some investigations require cleanup. Sigh again.

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